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Abstract
Economists have developed a range of empirically tractable demand systems for
ﬁxed price markets. But auction mechanisms also play an important part in allocating
goods, and yet existing empirical auction techniques treat each auction in isolation,
obscuring market interactions. Here we provide a framework for estimating a demand
system in a large auction platform market with a dynamic population of buyers, het-
erogeneous objects and unit demand. We construct a model of repeated second-price
auctions in which bidders have multidimensional private valuations, developing an
equilibrium concept under which strategies reﬂect option values. We prove existence
of this equilibrium and characterize the ergodic distribution of types. Having devel-
oped a demand system, we show that it is non-parametrically identiﬁed from panel
data. Relatively simple nonparametric and semiparametric estimation procedures are
proposed and tested by Monte Carlo simulation. Our analysis highlights the impor-
tance of both dynamic bidding strategies and panel data sample selection issues when
analyzing these markets.
∗We are grateful to Chris Adams, Gary Chamberlain, Ken Hendricks, Ariel Pakes, Maher Said, and
participants at the UBC Summer IO conference, SITE, the SIEPR conference on internet economics and
the FTC-NU microeconomics conference for helpful suggestions; and for comments in seminars at Haas,
Stanford, UCSC, UCSD and Yale. All remaining errors are our own.1 Introduction
Most goods and services are sold at ﬁxed prices. Yet auctions are used as the allocation mech-
anism in a wide variety of contexts, including procurement and the granting of oil drilling
and spectrum rights. Online auction platforms, in particular, have grown substantially in
recent years. In retail eBay alone has revenues of $36 billion from its auctions business in
20071, while Google realized $21 billion in revenue from its online advertising platform in
20082. More specialized auction sites such as DoveBid and IronPlanet have sold billions of
dollars of used aviation and construction equipment respectively.
Given their importance in the modern economy, one would like to be able to estimate demand
in these platform markets. This would allow us to answer questions of broad economic
interest, such as how much welfare has been generated by these platforms; as well as narrower
strategic questions, such as how a ﬁrm with a ﬁxed inventory should set reserves and time
sales to dynamically maximize its revenue. Demand estimation is often also a necessary ﬁrst
step for the evaluation of anti-trust issues, such as the potential impact on the search-keyword
advertising market of a merger between Microsoft and Yahoo.
At ﬁrst glance, auctions data is an extremely rich of information about demand. In auctions
we actually observe a continuous bid which directly reﬂects willingness to pay, relative to the
discrete choice we typically see in ﬁxed price markets. Moreover, for any buyer we generally
observe all the auctions that they bid in, which provides valuable information about which
items they view as close substitutes. This is informative for demand, much in the same way
that “second-choice” data is useful in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004). As the choice
sets available to buyers vary we may observe diﬀering participation, which is helpful for
identifying substitution patterns.
Yet the strengths of auction market data also pose some diﬃculties. As Hendricks and
Porter (2007) note in their survey article, participants in auction markets are playing a
complex dynamic game, where they must continuously adapt to the changing set of available
auctions, and learn about rival’s valuations. Most of the existing tools of structural auction
econometrics are focused on independent auctions of homogenous objects, which limits their
direct applicability to auction demand estimation, where bidders repeatedly interact across
auctions, and substitution across products is important.
1Source: eBay Annual Report for 2007
2Source: Google Annual Report for 2008
1In this paper, we develop an estimable demand system for an auction platform market with
a large number of relatively short-lived, yet persistent, buyers. The ﬁrst part of the paper
outlines an intuitive and empirically tractable equilibrium concept — competitive Markov
equilibrium — and characterizes the long-run distribution of bidders and their strategies.
Next, we show that demand is non-parametrically identiﬁed from panel data. In the last
part, we develop a nonparametric and a semiparametric estimation approach for backing
out demand from bid data. We also show how to estimate a characteristic-based model of
demand. These approaches are tested by Monte Carlo simulation and found to work well in
moderately sized samples.
To begin, the theory section introduces a stylized model of an auction market, in which
each period a good is sold by second-price sealed bid auction. There are a ﬁnite number
of diﬀerent goods that can be sold, and supply of these goods is exogenous. Bidders have
multidimensional private valuations over the diﬀerent goods. These valuations may be cor-
related. They have unit demand, and upon entry participate in every auction until they
either win or randomly exit. The stage game is played each period over an inﬁnite horizon.
The environment is complicated, because for any bidder the set of rival types is unknown,
and Bayes-Nash equilibrium would imply that everyone simultaneously solves a ﬁltration
problem, using the observed history — possibly private and arbitrarily long — to infer the
distribution of types. We simplify by developing an equilibrium concept in which bidders
condition only on a coarser publicly observable state vector in forming beliefs about rival
types, and that they take the state evolution as exogenous. We call this notion competitive
Markov equilibrium, and argue that it is appropriate for large anonymous markets.
Then, if bidders have unit demand, we have a simple way to deal with dynamic concerns.
Participation has an option value: the expected surplus from future auctions conditional
on today’s state. This option value is struck when a bidder wins an auction, so she shades
her bids accordingly. The challenge of estimating private values is then estimating the long-
run option value. We show that this is non-parametrically identiﬁed from observing both
individual bidder time series and the full bid distribution across states.
The ﬁnal part of the paper is concerned with estimation. We oﬀer two approaches. One
follows the nonparametric identiﬁcation logic directly, showing that by looking at the time
series of bidders who are observed bidding in every state we can back out their individual
valuations. As is common with panel data, there are selection concerns. These bidders are
2a selected sample, and to get the true distribution of valuations, it is necessary to re-weight
the estimated density. We show how to do this.
A disadvantage of the nonparametric method is that it is data intensive, since if the state
space is large, the set of bidders who bid in every state may be very small. By making a
parametric assumption on the type distribution, we can make use of the remaining data. We
ﬁrst show how to estimate the bid function for any type directly from the data, and then
argue that this allows us to simulate moments given any parameter vector. We can thus
apply simulated GMM to consistently estimate the true parameter vector.
The paper is related to various strands of literature. Jofre-Benet and Pesendorfer (2003) was
the ﬁrst paper to attack estimation in a dynamic auction game, though in a world where
private information was transient. Subsequent to this, a number of papers have looked
at dynamics on the eBay platform speciﬁcally. Budish (2008) examines the optimality of
eBay’s market design with respect to the sequencing of sales and information revelation. In
Said (2009), the author investigates eﬃciency and revenue maximization in a similar setup
through the lens of dynamic mechanism design. Zeithammer (2006) developed a model with
forward-looking bidders, and showed both theoretically and empirically that bidders shade
down current bids in response to the presence of upcoming auctions of similar objects. Ingster
(2009) develops a dynamic model of auctions of identical objects, and provides equilibrium
characterization and identiﬁcation results. Sailer (2006) estimates participation costs for
bidders facing an inﬁnite sequence of identical auctions. Relative to this literature, our main
contribution is the focus on sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects, where bidders
have multidimensional persistent private valuations. In short, we are focused on developing
a demand system. A diﬀerent approach has been taken in Adams (2009), who looks at the
problem of nonparametric identiﬁcation when auctions are completely simultaneous.
A second related literature is on alternative equilibrium notions for dynamic games. In
coarsening the set of information bidders condition on, we are following the path of Krusell
and Smith (1998). Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) develops the related notion of
oblivious equilibrium. Fershtman and Pakes (2009) also emphasizes the importance of a ﬁnite
state space. Finally, we build on the literature for estimating demand systems in durable
goods markets (e.g. Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Gowrisankaran and
Rysman (2009)).
The next section introduces the theoretical framework, while section 3 proves non-parametric
3identiﬁcation. Section 4 describes our two diﬀerent estimation approaches, while section 5
gives Monte Carlo simulations for those estimators. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Our aim in this section is to create an abstract model of a large auction market, and analyze
it. The space of such models is vast, and we narrow in a number of ways. We consider a
market in which similar products — such as iPods and Zunes — are sold by second-price
sealed bid auctions. These auctions are held in discrete time, with one good auctioned per
period over an inﬁnite horizon. Since our focus is on demand, we assume for simplicity that
supply is random and exogenous. Bidders are persistent with unit demand, and enter the
market with private (possibly correlated) valuations for each of the objects. Winning bidders
immediately exit, while losing bidders exit randomly. We aim at characterizing the long-run
behavior of this dynamic system.
We have chosen this set of assumptions to match some features of the environment on eBay,
whose platform design dominates online auctions. In any eBay category, there are many
diﬀerent products sold by auction to a large number of anonymous buyers.3 Although these
auctions typically last for many days, and thus overlap — so that at any given point in time
there are many auctions occurring simultaneously — they ﬁnish at diﬀerent ending times,
in sequence. As Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) and Hendricks and Porter (2007) have noted,
this timing, combined with the way the proxy bidding system works, imply that eBay is well
approximated as sequence of second-price sealed bid auctions. Yet our intent is not to model
eBay per se — and indeed we ignore some important features of the eBay environment —
but rather to develop a reasonably motivated and rich abstract model and see what we can
learn from the exercise.
2.1 Environment
We formalize the above description of the environment in what follows:
Bidders and Payoﬀs: Bidders have unit demand for a good in the set J, where |J| = J.
Their demand is summarized by a privately known vector of valuations x =( x1,x 2 ···xJ),
3eBay hides the identity of the bidders by replacing parts of the username with asterixes.
4their type. They are risk neutral, and receive a payoﬀ of xj − p for buying a single good j
at price p, and zero otherwise. Bidders are impatient, with a common discount rate δ.
Market: Time is discrete with inﬁnite horizon, t =1 ,2···. In each period t, the following
stage game is played. First, a sealed-bid second price auction is held for the current object
jt, in which all bidders present in the market may participate. Then entry and exit of bidders
takes place, and suppliers post new objects. These are described in more detail below.
Auctions: At time t,o b j e c tjt ∈Jis auctioned. Bidders have the choice between not
participating (action φ), and submitting a bid. The action space is thus A = φ∪R+, where
A is totally ordered under the usual ordering < with φ<0. The highest bidder wins the
auction and pays the second highest bid, or zero if his is the only bid submitted. Ties are
broken randomly. If no-one participates, the item is not sold.
Entry and Exit: At the end of every period, the winner is assumed to exit with certainty.4
Losers exogenously exit the market with probability ρ ∈ (0,1), receiving a payoﬀ normalized
to zero on exit. Simultaneously, Et new bidders enter, where Et is random with a distribution
that depends on the total number of buyers in the previous period Nt−1. We assume that
Et|Nt−1 has strictly positive support on the ﬁnite set of integers {0,1,2···N −Nt−1}. This
ensures that the size of the market does not explode.5 Each entrant draws their valuation
vector x identically and independently from a distribution F with associated strictly positive
density f, and support a compact set X = [0, ¯ x]J.
Supply: Supply is essentially the rate at which diﬀerent products appear on the auction
market. At the end of period t, suppliers list a new object to be auctioned in period t+1+kf,
where kf is the lead-time bidders have in observing future supply. The object to be auctioned
is randomly chosen according to a multinomial distribution over the set of products J.6
Information Sets and Bidding Strategies: New entrants are assumed to be able to
view the history of the game for the last kh periods.7 Incumbent bidders may have observed
more: at time t, a bidder i who entered the market time ti can observe a ”window” of
past actions and current and upcoming auctions, from ti − kh to t + kf. The cases kh =0
4Since they have unit demand, they are indiﬀerent about exiting in any period following a win. But even
an ε>0 participation cost would make exit optimal.
5With endogenous entry, one would expect a condition like this to hold: entry falls as the number of
participants in the market increases, and so surplus falls. With exogenous entry, we must impose it.
6It is easy to extend the model to allow for ﬂuctuating total supply by letting the the object be multinomial
over J∪∅,w h e r e∅ is the event that nothing is listed.
7This mimics eBay, where the history of auctions held in the past 14+ days is public, though anonymized).
5and kf = 0 correspond to no observable public history and no knowledge of future supply,
respectively. So a generic information set consists of a valuation x, the history hit and the
list of current and upcoming objects jt =( jt ···jt+kf). A (pure) bid strategy is a mapping
βi : X×H it ×Jkf+1 →Afrom any information set to the action set.
2.2 Analysis
We analyze this environment in three parts. First, we motivate and deﬁne a new equilibrium
concept called a competitive Markov equilibrium (CME) that we think is appropriate for
long-run analysis of large markets. Under this equilibrium, we show that strategies take a
simple and intuitive form: bidders bid their valuation for the good under auction, less their
continuation value. Second, we characterize the long-run properties of the dynamic system
for arbitrary strategies, showing that a stationary distribution over types exists. Finally,
we combine these two pieces — equilibrium characterization and long-run dynamics — to
show existence of a CME. We also argue that as the market becomes large, while holding
the ratio of buyers to sellers ﬁxed, the CME tends towards the anonymous equilibrium of
the continuum game.
To motivate the concept, consider the decision problem of a bidder in this environment. He
knows the recent history of the market, current supply and his own valuation. What he
doesn’t know is who else is in the market (his rivals, their valuations and their history),
nor how they will bid. In addition, he must form expectations about future demand con-
ditions, and should in principle worry about “leakage”; his bid today might reveal valuable
information to future rivals. Addressing these issues with standard equilibrium concepts is
problematic. Though Milgrom and Weber (2000) were able to provide an elegant equilibrium
characterization of sequential auctions under certain information structures, their approach
is essentially static and does not extend to the inﬁnite horizon case.8 In this environment,
forming rational expectations about the play of opponents requires some notion of the long-
run stationary distribution of types, but without placing some structure on the admissible
strategies, the state space may grow without bound.
Technical objections aside, expecting this behavior from bidders in large markets seems
unrealistic. Bidders on eBay don’t worry about leakage, because they don’t expect their
8They consider the problem of auctioning k identical objects to n bidders, where n>k , and the bidders
all enter in the ﬁrst period.
6individual bids to be tracked by rivals. Rivals don’t track them because the market is large,
turnover is rapid, and there is little to be gained from the information. Basically, bidders
expect that with this many auctions, the probability of meeting the same opponents in the
future is low.
To capture this intuition, we assume that bidders believe that now — and in the future —
they are to compete with a random draw from the long-run population of types. These beliefs
may be conditioned on some simple and publicly observable “state” variables, such as recent
prices, which may be informative as to whether demand is currently high or low. Bidders
have rational expectations, and their beliefs will be correct in equilibrium. Importantly, they
will take the state as given and its evolution as exogenous, though in fact since the market
is ﬁnite, their actions may have some impact on the state transitions.
This kind of assumption was introduced in the macroeconomics literature by Krusell and
Smith (1998) as a behavioral assumption, arguing that agents will make inferences based on
simple functionals of all the information available in the environment, at least when doing
so loses little information. The special case where agents ignore all current information and
the state is constant or exogenously given has a complete information counterpart in the
oblivious equilibrium concept of Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008). We also provide
a “large-market” justiﬁcation of the assumption in the discussion below.
Formally, for any public history of actions ht =( at−1 ···at−kh), let hanon
t be the anonymized
history (i.e. where identiﬁers on bid identity are removed). The associated space of anonymized
histories is stationary, and denoted as Hanon ≡A kh×N. Bidders also know the supply
jt ∈Jkf+1, implying the space of all anonymized public information is Hanon ×Jkf+1.D e -
ﬁne a coarsening function T as a (Borel) measurable function that ﬁnitely partitions the
space into “states” s ∈S , where |S| = S. We require that T partitions diﬀerent current
objects into diﬀerent states, so that minimally the agent conditions on the object under
auction — in math, jt ￿= j￿
t ⇒ T(hanon
t ,jt) ￿= T(hanon￿
t ,jt
￿).
This coarsening T deﬁnes the state space, and therefore what bidders pay attention to.
Bidders must also have a model of state transitions. Deﬁne Q as the transition matrix
between states, with typical element Qij = P(s￿ = j|s = i), for s￿ the state tomorrow.
Our notion of equilibrium requires that bidders correctly understand the distribution of
competing types and the state transitions, and optimize against this:
Deﬁnition 1 (Competitive Markov Equilibrium). A (symmetric) competitive Markov
7equilibrium (CME) with respect to a coarsening function T consists of:
(i) Correct beliefs about the ergodic distribution of opposing types conditional on any s ∈S ;
and about the state transition matrix Q
(ii) Symmetric Markovian strategies β(x,s) that maximize expected payoﬀs given beliefs.
Let us unpack this a bit. The CME is extremely similar to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, requir-
ing that strategies are optimal given beliefs; and that beliefs are consistent with equilibrium
play. The key diﬀerences are that here bidders condition only on the state s in forming
beliefs, even when this is coarser than the public information available to them; and that
they do not account for how their actions may inﬂuence the state transitions Q. This is the
is the “competitive” part of the name, as it corresponds to the case in perfect competition
where ﬁrms do not recognize that their joint production decisions determine the price. Here,
bidders behave as though they were small, and do not endogenize the impact of their own
actions on the future states. Another important diﬀerence is that this is a long-run concept:
bidders believe they face draws from the ergodic distribution of types, which is a sensible
belief only if the market does indeed converge to a long-run distribution and has been in
operation for a while. This formulation avoids the issue of a prior on the initial type draw.
It turns out that under these assumptions, the equilibrium bidding strategy β(x,s) has a
intuitive and simple form. Temporarily putting aside questions of stationarity and existence,
ﬁx a CME. Bidders have well-deﬁned beliefs about the distribution of types in any state, and
given the equilibrium bid strategies, can also work out the distribution of highest opposing
bids (i.e. the bid they need to beat to win). They also have rational expectations about
state transitions. This allows us to deﬁne an (ex-post) value function for a type x in state s:
v(x,s)=m a x
b∈A
G1(b|s)
￿
xt − E[B
1|B
1 <b ,s ]
￿
+( 1− G1(b|s))δ(1 − ρ)
S ￿
s￿=1
v(x,s
￿)Qss￿ (1)
where G1(·|s) is the distribution of the highest opposing bid today given the state; xt is the
bidder’s valuation of the object currently under auction, and Q is the equilibrium transition
matrix. The ﬁrst term in the value function is the probability of winning — the probability
that the highest opposing bid is lower — times the surplus conditional on winning, equal
to current valuation less expected payment. The second term is the probability of losing
times the continuation value in that event. Non-participation (φ) implies certain loss, so
8G1(φ|s)=0∀s.
Now let ￿ v(x,s)=δ(1 − ρ)
￿S
s￿=1 v(x,s￿)Qss￿ denote the discounted ex-ante value function
(i.e. before exit and state transitions are determined). Maximizing the value function above,
we get the optimal strategies:
Lemma 1 ( Equilibrium Strategies). In a symmetric CME, bidders bid their valuation
less their ex-ante continuation value if it is positive; otherwise they don’t participate:
β(x,s)=



xt − ￿ v(x,s) ,x t − ￿ v(x,s) ≥ 0
φ, otherwise
(2)
Think about this process as a single auction, where the winner gets the object, and the losers
are awarded a prize with value equal to the continuation value. Re-normalizing the prizes,
it’s like a standard second-price auction where the winner gets the object less continuation
value, and losers get nothing. Then the weakly dominant strategy is to bid the value of the
prize, which is just the value of the object less the continuation value.9 In the case where
the “prize” has negative value, there is no reason to participate.
The intuitive appeal of this characterization is that it reduces the bidder problem to forming
some expectation of their continuation value, which should be informed by the state of the
market (recent history and future supply). Under a CME, we require these expectations to
be correct in the sense of matching the long-run behavior of the system.
Our next step is to analyze these dynamics. Since bidders enter and exit every period over
an inﬁnite horizon, if we kept track of speciﬁc identities the state-space would grow without
bound. So for the long-run analysis, we ignore identity, and keep track of an anonymous
N-vector xt of types currently in the market.10
We let the “true state” of the market ωt ∈ Ω ≡XN ×S be deﬁned by the anonymized vector
of types xt and the state st. For any symmetric strategy β, the true state evolves as a ﬁrst
9As Budish (2008), Said (2009) and Zeithammer (2009) all note, this is not true in the full Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, due to a winner’s curse eﬀect: on winning, a bidder learns that the remaining types had lower
valuations, and therefore regrets winning now rather than later at a lower price. This eﬀect is swept away
in a CME, since bidders take the state evolution as exogenous.
10We use 0 as a placeholder when there are fewer than N bidders in the market. Type transitions occur ﬁrst
by removing exiting bidders and replacing them with the placeholder, and then adding entrants sequentially,
starting from the ﬁrst open placeholder. For example, suppose we have N = 3, and there are two bidders
with (unidimensional valuations) 1 and 2 respectively. Then we have xt =( 1 ,2,0); and if at the end of the
period bidder 1 exits and two new bidders with values 3 and 4 respectively enter, we will have xt+1 =( 3 ,2,4).
9order Markov process, with the type transitions governed by the entry and exit rules. The
state transitions are determined by the exogenous supply and the actions taken by the types
in accordance with the strategies. Denote by F the Borel σ-ﬁeld over Ω.
Lemma 2 (Ergodic Distribution of True States). For any strategy β, there is a unique
invariant measure µβ on the measurable space (Ω,F), strongly converged to at uniform geo-
metric rate from any initial measure µ0. The conditional ergodic distribution of x−i given s
exists and is well-deﬁned for any s ∈S .
This says that the market “settles down” to a steady-state, regardless of the initial conditions,
with a unique stationary distribution of types in each state. The intuition for this is that entry
and supply are exogenous, and only the exit of winning bidders is endogenously determined.
This has a limited inﬂuence on the long-run evolution of the market.11 An implication of
this is that in the long-run, given any strategies, agents have well-deﬁned beliefs about the
population of bidders they face. We can now look for a ﬁxed point: strategies that are optimal
given long-run beliefs; and beliefs that are consistent with the ergodic distributions induced
by these strategies. We will call a strategy β(x,s) monotone if in every state bids increase in
the valuation of the good under auction, and decrease in the valuations of other objects. We
say it is strictly monotone if the monotonicity is strict except for non-participating types.12
Theorem 1 (Existence). For any coarsening function T, there exists a CME in continuous
strictly monotone pure strategies. If there is only one product, the CME is unique.
The proof is non-trivial.13 One would like to exploit the characterization of the bidding
strategies in (2), and show existence of a ﬁxed point of the best response operator Γ(β)=
xt−￿ vβ(x,s). But as is often the case in auction theory, Γ does not map continuous functions
into continuous functions since if some types “play an atom” under β, then the continuation
value ￿ vβ(x,s) may be discontinuous at some points.
So instead we take a diﬀerent and well-trodden approach, discretizing the action space, and
then applying the methodology of Reny (2008) based on contractible mappings to show a
ﬁxed point of the ﬁnite action game. Since whether bids increase or decrease in the valuations
11The formal proof uses a renewal argument, based on the idea that the mean hitting time to the “null
set” where everyone has exited the market is ﬁnite.
12That is, β(x,s) is strictly increasing in xt except possibly where β(x,s)=φ.
13Duﬃe, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) establish existence for a broad class of stochastic
games, but strategies may be mixed and a public coordination device is required.
10depends on the state, we cannot directly apply his results, and must modify some parts of
the proof.14 A limiting argument as in Athey (2001) yields an equilibrium for the continuous
action game. In the case where there is only one product, we can show that the Γ operator
is a contraction mapping, implying a unique CME.
Finally, to conclude this section, we wish to argue (informally) that for large markets, this
concept is a sensible approximation to a more standard equilibrium concept, anonymous
equilibrium. One way to do this is to show that as the markets become arbitrarily large,
the set of equilibria coincide. So consider a modiﬁcation of this model in which instead of
one auction being held in each period, we instead had n auctions of the same good, and nρ
times as many entrants. This implies that as n →∞the buyer/seller ratio converges to
a constant. As in the classic paper of Wolinsky (1988), assume that bidders are randomly
assigned to each of the n auctions.15
We must show that in any limiting CME, no bidder can improve their payoﬀ by instead
employing an anonymous strategy. Notice that as as n →∞ , by the usual abuse of the
law of large numbers, the distribution of types in every period will be exactly the stationary
distribution. Then since supply is exogenous, the CME assumption that individual bidders
cannot aﬀect the state transitions becomes exact. It is then easy to show that optimal bidding
strategies still take the form of valuation less continuation value. Now any anonymous
strategy cannot condition on identity, and so since the stationary distribution is realized
every period, there is no value to conditioning on the past. This implies that both the
limiting CME and anonymous strategies will not vary with past play. Then provided the
CME strategy does not coarsen away information about future auctions (i.e. T is such that
bidders use all the information available about future supply), the CME and anonymous
strategies will coincide. The limiting CME will be an equilibrium of the corresponding
anonymous discounted sequential game, in the language of Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988).
So we learn that the fundamental simpliﬁcation that we make — even in the limit — is
that bidders do not keep track of identity; for if they did, they could perhaps proﬁtably
condition on recent history if they happened to be randomly matched with other incumbent
14Reny (2008) allows for arbitrary partial orders on both the type and action spaces, but requires that
under those orders, increasing types must take increasing actions. In our case, increasing types (e.g. a higher
valuation for object 1) take some higher actions (bid higher in states where 1 is auctioned) and lower actions
(bid lower in states where 2 is auctioned).
15The random assignment assumption is common in the theory literature: see also Satterthwaite and
Shneyerov (2007).
11bidders. Our intuition for why anonymity is a reasonable assumption comes from large online
markets, where bidders rarely expect to meet the same opponents again, and even when they
do, are typically not aware of it. If you believe, as we do, that the anonymity assumption
is reasonable in large markets, then the CME concept is attractive because it preserves the
limiting properties of other concepts while allowing for strategies that respond to endogenous
ﬂuctuations in state. On the other hand, if bidders pay attention to the speciﬁc actions of
other bidders — as would be the case in a small or concentrated market — it is less sensible.
Lemmas 1 and 2 provide the main take homes from this section. First, in equilibrium
bidders shade their bids down from their values, where the extent of shading depends on
their continuation value in the current state. Notice immediately that this is starkly diﬀerent
from the “usual” model of second-price sealed bid auctions, where bids may be interpreted
as valuations. Indeed, valuations are strictly higher than bids, implying that nonparametric
estimates of the value distribution obtained by treating auctions as independent will be
systematically biased upward. Second, the stationary distribution of types exists, but is
diﬀerent from the valuation distribution F, due to selection: bidders with low valuations
will persist in the market for longer. So again, treating the auction data as a cross-section
would be misleading. In the next section we develop nonparametric identiﬁcation results for
large auction markets that addresses both of these issues.
3 Nonparametric Identiﬁcation
Equilibrium play implies a precise data generating process, with bidders entering, making
bids and exiting according to the model. Suppose that one were to observe all the data
produced in the course of equilibrium play, essentially consisting of the object auctioned in
each period, the bids placed and the associated bidder identities. Could one then identify
the underlying distribution of valuations, and thus recover demand?
We give a nonparametric identiﬁcation result in the spirit of Athey and Haile (2002).16 We
think this is useful because it makes explicit the assumptions that are needed to identify
the primitives of the dynamic game, as well as providing some guidance as to a sensible
estimation strategy. For intuition, we will ﬁrst work through a simple two good example.
16Similar identiﬁcation arguments were made in Jofre-Benet and Pesendorfer (2003) and Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2003). Our identiﬁcation problem diﬀers substantively since there are persistent latent
variables — the valuations — whereas in their setup it is only the observable state variables that may persist.
123.1 Example
Suppose there are two goods, so J = {j1,j 2}. The exit probability ρ is constant across
states. Supply is binomial and independent of state, with q the probability of good 1.
Bidders coarsen the public information so that they condition only on the product identity
in the current and next auction, implying four states: 1 = {1,1},2={1,2},3={2,1} and
4={2,2}. Recall that an equilibrium bid strategy for a type x is a bid in each state, and
let the equilibrium bids for a ﬁxed type be b1 ···b4. Then the interim continuation value in
state i, vi, is given by:
vi = G1(bi|i)(xi − E[B1|B1 <b i,i]) + δ(1 − ρ)(1 − G1(bi|i))
4 ￿
j=1
Qij vj
where Q is the transition matrix between states. From the bidding function, we substitute
out xi as bi + ￿ vi, where ￿ vi is the ex-ante continuation value. Rearranging terms yields:
vi − δ(1 − ρ)
4 ￿
j=1
Qij vj = G1(bi|i)(bi − E[B1|B1 <b i,i]) (3)
Let v =[ v1,v 2,v 3,v 4]T, and let u be given by:
u ≡

   

G1(b1|1)(b1 − E[B1|B1 <b 1,1])
G1(b2|2)(b2 − E[B1|B1 <b 2,2])
G1(b3|3)(b3 − E[B1|B1 <b 3,3])
G1(b4|4)(b4 − E[B1|B1 <b 4,4])

   

i.e. the expected diﬀerence between bid and payment in any one period. Then (3) can be
represented as the linear system:
(I − δ(1 − ρ)Q)v = u
where I is an S × S identity matrix. Next standard results imply that (I − δ(1 − ρ)Q)
is invertible, and therefore the existence of a unique solution for v (Stokey, Lucas, and
Prescott 1989). Thus we have:
v =( I − δ(1 − ρ)Q)
−1 u
13Up to now, we have just been manipulating mathematical expressions. We now turn to the
question of identiﬁcation. Suppose that the econometrician knows the coarsening function
T (i.e. the mapping from the public information, which is observed, to the state variables).
Then each of the auctions can be correctly classiﬁed into the four states. Now ﬁx a particular
bidder in the dataset, who is observed participating in every state. For such a bidder, we
can construct an S-length bid vector b = b1 ···b4 corresponding to their bid in each of the
four states.17 We shall call such bid vectors “complete”. Plugging this vector into the above
expression for u, we can recover the expected diﬀerence between payment and bid.
The transition matrix Q and exit probability ρ are identiﬁed directly from the data. So if
the econometrician also knows the discount factor ρ, then the interim continuation values v
of any type who bids b is identiﬁed. Now, we can move from v to the actual valuations x by
again using the bid function expression:
x1 = b1 + δ(1 − ρ)(qv1 +( 1− q)v2)=b2 + δ(1 − ρ)(qv3 +( 1− q)v4)
x2 = b3 + δ(1 − ρ)(qv1 +( 1− q)v2)=b4 + δ(1 − ρ)(qv3 +( 1− q)v4)
where the expressions reﬂect the fact that good 1 is auctioned in states 1 and 2, while good
2 is auctioned in states 3 and 4. Thus for any bid vector b, we have identiﬁed the underlying
valuation x =( x1,x 2), which is unique. In fact you can see that in this case, where |J| < |S|,
the valuations are over-identiﬁed. This provides a potential test of the theory.
Given a random sample of complete bid-vectors, one could thus identify the valuation dis-
tribution F. But in the actual data the set of complete bid vectors is a selected sample, as
some types will never participate in some states, and some types will persist longer, thus
potentially being over-sampled. Assume for simplicity that all types participate in all states.
So the key is to address the selection issue. As we show in the appendix, once the type
x is identiﬁed for bid vector b, the probability that the bid vector is complete can also be
identiﬁed.18 Thus by inverting individual complete bid vectors to valuation vectors, and
then re-weighting the density of these valuations by the inverse of the probability that they
would be complete, we can identify the type density. This gives us demand.
17Of course, in the data they may have made many more than four bids; but as long as they have bid in
every state, this construction is feasible.
18The idea is to recursively deﬁne the probability of being seen only in state 1, then in states 1 and 2....
143.2 Formal Result
The formal result simply summarizes what we have learnt from the example. The only
diﬀerence is that we need to be a little careful about what we can identify for bidders who
don’t participate. Clearly, if a type never bids on product one, say, regardless of what the
state is, then we cannot identify their valuation for product one. Thus for each subset B
of J, partition the type space X into 2J − 1 sets of types who bid only on products in B,
regardless of the state. Let XB be the |B|-dimensional random variable deﬁned by restricting
valuations X to products in B, with distribution function FB(xB) ≡ P(XB ≤ xB|X ∈ B).
Then we have the following result:
Theorem 2 (Identiﬁcation). If the discount rate δ and the coarsening function T are
known, the distribution FB is non-parametrically identiﬁed for all B ⊆J . Moreover, the
private valuation of any bidder observed bidding in every state s ∈ S is identiﬁed.
The conditions for identiﬁcation are slightly stronger than is usual in these dynamic settings.
Typically, it is necessary to know the discount rate.19 But here the econometrician must
also know the coarsening function. This is because the CME concept does not nail down
bidder beliefs; it can accommodate a variety of models about which variables bidders pay
attention to. The downside with this is that the econometrician must actually work out what
those variables are in order to identify demand. Given these assumptions, we get pointwise
identiﬁcation for complete observations, via the same argument as in the example. We also
get identiﬁcation of the distribution of types who make a positive bid on every object.
In fact, if bidders are suﬃciently forward looking, all types will make positive bids on every
object in some state. To see this, notice that what causes a bidder to never bid on product
j is the lost future surplus from winning other objects in future auctions. But if product j
is to be auctioned every period for a long time — an event that will eventually happen —
then the discounted future surplus from other objects will be very small, implying that they
will bid on product j. Intuitively, variation in the set of upcoming auctions can be used to
identify the valuations of bidders who may generally not participate.
19But as Ackerberg, Hirano, and Shahriar (2009) argue, if there are buy price auctions on the platform, it
may be possible to identify discount rates from the data.
154 Estimation Strategy
Suppose that the conditions of the Theorem 2 are met, and the econometrician knows or can
determine the discount rate and coarsening function. He also has a panel dataset, consisting
of all the bids placed in each auction and bidder identify. Assume also for simplicity that
all types bid on every good.20 How should estimation proceed? We propose two diﬀerent
approaches. The ﬁrst approach is nonparametric, following the logic of the identiﬁcation
section by inverting from observed bids to valuations. We look directly at the individual-
level micro-data, treating the record of all bids placed by a given bidder as an observation.
The individual-level data may diﬀer in its dimensions: for some bidders, we may only see
a single bid, while for others we may see many bids. The structural model implies that at
most we should see S distinct bids by any one bidder, a diﬀerent bid for every state. In the
language of the section above, these S length bid vectors are “complete observations”.
For complete observations, we can invert from the bid vector to a valuation vector via the
ﬁrst order condition provided we have estimates of the transition matrix and the distribution
of opposing bids. This is very much like the approach of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000).
One important diﬀerence is that the set of complete observations is a selected sample of the
bidders — bidders with high valuations are more likely to win and exit quickly, and therefore
less likely to be observed bidding in every state. For this reason, it is necessary to re-weight
the density of the estimated valuations in order to get an estimate of the type density.
The nonparametric approach is very clean and makes no parametric assumptions, but re-
quires a fair number of complete observations. This may be impractical in markets with
many states and high turnover in participants. Many bidders on eBay, for example, par-
ticipate in only one or two auctions before either winning or giving up. We therefore also
outline two additional approaches, where we impose successively more stringent parametric
assumptions. First, we outline a semiparametric estimation approach based on simulated
generalized method of moments, as is used elsewhere for demand estimation in industrial
organization and marketing. There we assume a parametric structure on the distribution of
types, and then choose parameters to match moments implied by the structural model with
those observed in the data.
Even in that case, if there are a large number of products the model quickly becomes un-
20Where this fails, the estimation results presented here can be adapted with more work to account for
non-participation; but it is important that non-participation is observable.
16wieldy. So, following the literature (e.g. McFadden (1974)) we consider projecting product
valuations onto characteristics. Instead of types being valuations for products, types are now
random coeﬃcients indicating the marginal value of product characteristics. In the standard
speciﬁcation we consider, this implies a linear structure for valuations in characteristics. Un-
der reasonable distributional assumptions on the random coeﬃcients, this linearity can be
exploited and a very simple estimation procedure can be used.
Regardless of the approach — nonparametric, semiparametric or characteristic-based —
there is a common ﬁrst step in which a number of primitives are estimated.
4.1 Step 1: Estimate transitions, exit and payments
In the ﬁrst step, we non-parametrically estimate the probability of winning with a bid of
b in state s, G1(b|s); the expected payment conditional on winning, E[B1|B1 <b , s ]; the
Markov transition matrix Q; the invariant measure over states π; and the probability of exit
conditional on losing, ρ =[ ρ1,ρ 2 ···ρS]. This ﬁrst step can be summarized as estimating
elements of the per period payoﬀs and the transition probabilities, and is similar to that of
both Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) and Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) in their
papers on dynamic games estimation.
All of these are conditional moments, and provided the conditioning variable is discrete —
as the state variable is — we can consistently estimate the conditional moment from the
relevant empirical analogue. So for example, to estimate an element of the transition matrix
Qij, we have:
￿ Qij =
￿T
t=1 1(st−1 = i)1(st = j)
￿T
t=1 1(st−1 = i)
where t =1 ···T indexes auctions and 1(·) is an indicator function. The only “diﬃcult”
object to estimate is E[B1|B1 <b ,s ] because for ﬁxed s the conditioning variable b is con-
tinuous. This can be done state-by-state using any nonparametric approach, such as kernel
density or sieve estimation.
4.2 Nonparametric Approach Step 2: Recover valuations
The key to the non-parametric approach is to treat the data as a sequence of (short) time
series, one for each bidder. We restrict attention to complete observations, a subset of our
17dataset consisting of S-dimensional bid vectors bi =( bi1 ...b iS).
For each observation i, we can use the ﬁrst-stage estimates to construct a vector ￿ ui =
(￿ ui1,￿ ui2 ...￿ uiS), where ￿ uis = bis − ￿ E[B1|B1 <b is,s]. Then the interim continuation value
for bidder i, ￿ vi =( ￿ vi1 ...￿ viS), is the solution to the linear system ￿ vi =( I − δ(1 − ρ)￿ Q)−1￿ ui.
Moreover, we have from (2) that given a J-length sub-vector ￿ bi of bi consisting of bids on
diﬀerent objects, an associated sub-vector ￿ ρ of ρ, and an associated J × S submatrix ￿ Q of
Q consisting of the transitions associated with the bids in ￿ bi,w eg e txi = ￿ bi + δ(1 − ￿ ρ)￿ Qvi.
Substituting in our estimates on the right hand side of this expression, we get an estimate
￿ xi of the valuation of each bidder.
The set of bidders with complete observations is a selected sample, and we need to correct for
this. In the appendix, we derive an expression for P(A,x), the probability that a type x is
observed bidding only in the set of states in A,f o rA ⊆ S. This expression is identiﬁed from
previously estimated objects. Now, the probability that a given type generates a complete
observation is P(S,x). We can thus correct for the selection bias by assigning a weight equal
to 1/￿ P(S, ￿ xi)t oe a c h￿ xi, and then use weighted kernel density estimation to back out the
type density f(x).
We omit a formal analysis of the asymptotic properties of this estimator, both because it
takes us into the realm of non-parametric estimation with dependent data and because we
suspect that the semiparametric approach outlined below is more likely to be used in practice.
Yet intuitively Lemma 2 guarantees that the data generating process quickly converges to
an ergodic distribution, and so the asymptotics should be well-behaved. This is supported
by the estimator’s performance in our Monte Carlo experiments, below.
4.3 Semiparametric Approach Step 2a: Estimate bid function
The semiparametric approach goes in the opposite direction. Instead of inverting bids to
valuations we take draws from a parametrized type distribution, simulate bids, and match
the moments of the simulated bid distribution with those observed in the data. This places
weaker demands on the data, as we need not observe a large sample of complete bid vectors.
The ﬁrst part of the second step is working out how to simulate bids for a given type.
Our idea is to solve for the optimal biding function in this environment. Bidders in this
environment face a Markov Decision Problem (MDP): they need to choose a bid in each
18state to maximize their payoﬀ. As is the case in other environments, policy iteration will
suﬃce to ﬁnd the optimal bid vector for a type x.
To be more concrete, start with any initial strategy β0, such as bidding the object’s valuation
(β0(x,s)=xt). Then from (1), one can solve for the ex-ante continuation value given that
strategy by plugging in this bid into the probability of winning, expected payment on winning
etc. From this estimated continuation value v0(x,s), we can deﬁne a new strategy β1(x,s)=
xt−v0(x,s) and compute a new continuation value. Iterating in this way, we quickly converge
to the optimal policy, since the iteration process obeys a contraction mapping.21
4.4 Semiparametric Approach Step 2b: Match Moments
Once we have bidding strategies, we are close to being able to calculate moments of the bid
distribution in each state. Of course, we need to know not only how the types will bid, but
also the stationary distribution of types. To close the model then, we form a parametric
model for the type distribution Fθ ≡ F(X|θ), where θ is a ﬁnite dimensional parameter. Let
￿ F be the stationary distribution of types. Fθ and ￿ Fθ will typically be quite diﬀerent. Our
aim is to identify the true parameter vector θ0, as this identiﬁes demand.
A generic estimation approach is to simulate data from the structural model under θ, and
compare the simulated and sample moments. Any minimum distance estimator that chooses
θ to minimize the distance between thoughtfully chosen functionals of the observed and
actual bid distributions will converge to the true θ0, provided it is identiﬁed. To take a
speciﬁc example, consider comparing a moment like E[b|S = 1] — the mean bid in state 1 —
across the sample and the parametric model. Dropping repeated bids in the same state by
the same bidder, we can form the sample moment as a simple average. On the model side,
we need to calculate Eθ[β(X,1)], where the expectation is over the stationary distribution
of types who bid in state 1, which we can estimate for ﬁxed θ. The easiest way to do this is
to simulate draws from Fθ, and compute the relevant bids using the estimated bid function.
Yet as noted earlier, the stationary distribution of bids in state 1 is not the type distribution
F. So we need to re-weight the draws to consistently estimate Eθ[β(X,1)]. As we show in
the appendix, one can use the ﬁrst stage estimates to solve for the probability that in the
stationary distribution any type x will be observed bidding in any subset of states A ⊆S .
21Here, for example, we see the beneﬁt of assuming that bidders assume state transitions are exogenous.
For if not, one would need a model of the counterfactual state transitions had another strategy been followed.
19So the probability we see a bid in state 1 is just the complement of the probability of seeing
only bids in Ac, and we can use to correctly re-weight and account for the selection issue.
Although any minimum distance estimator will do — and indeed in the Monte Carlo we
use a particularly simple approach based on comparing the mean and variance of bids in a
state, and the covariance across pairs of states — for the asymptotics it is easiest to appeal
to standard results from the literature on GMM. Treat the data as a time series of auction
observations t =1···T. Then we can construct moment conditions based on the fact at the
truth, sample and simulated moments should coincide. The asymptotic theory of Hansen
(1982) applies, showing that provided the true parameter is identiﬁed and the environment
is strictly stationary, the GMM estimation approach will recover the truth asymptotically.
Note that Lemma 2 proves the stationarity of the environment, so that is satisﬁed. But we
need also appeal to the results of Pakes and Pollard (1989) to argue that the simulation error
has no impact on the asymptotic distribution of the estimator as the number of simulations
grows large; and to either Andrews (1994) or Ai and Chen (2003) to argue that the non-
parametric ﬁrst stage does not preclude
√
N consistency.
From a computational point of view, there are ways to speed up the estimation. One impor-
tant bottleneck is that for every new parameter update and sample of bidders, we must solve
a dynamic optimization problem for a large sample of simulated types. We can speed this
up using an importance sampling approach.22 Instead of drawing the types anew on each
iteration and solving out for their bidding strategies, instead choose a set of R types initially
to uniformly span some plausible region of X and compute their optimal bids. The choice
of initial region is up to the researcher: one suggestion might be to regress prices on states,
and then take the region of types spanned by the coeﬃcient estimate plus four standard
deviations on either side. This need only be done once. Then, to compute the simulated
moments, we weight the types according to their relative likelihood under θ and compute
the simulated moments as weighted sums.
4.5 Characteristic Space Approach
At the end of the day, we are trying to estimate the distribution of valuations over diﬀerent
products. As in the more general demand literature, this can be overly demanding of the data
22This idea was also used in Ackerberg (2003). See Ackerberg (2009) for a thorough discussion of this
technique.
20if the product space is large. Even after imposing a multivariate normal parametric structure,
for example, we need to estimate a variance covariance matrix with J(J +1 ) /2 parameters.
Given this, we may want to project valuations down onto product characteristics.
To do this, we assume that valuations depend on the characteristics of the goods zt ∈ Rk,
as well as on tastes for the characteristics and an unobserved utility shock:
xit = αizt + γi (4)
where we index individuals by i and auctions by t as before. The pair (αi,γ i) ∈ Rk+1 are
the individual’s type, reﬂecting tastes for the product characteristics and for buying a good
relative to the outside option. This is similar to the random coeﬃcients demand speciﬁcation
familiar from the discrete choice literature. The main diﬀerences are that γi replaces the
totally idiosyncratic shock εit; and that there is no unobserved heterogeneity term ξt.I na n
auction setup it makes sense to think of agents varying in their willingness to pay in a way
that does not depend on the characteristics, and so we add γi; whereas in discrete choice this
has no testable implications and so is omitted. Including also an idiosyncratic shock εit in
our speciﬁcation would create few problems for us. By contrast, unobserved heterogeneity
presents more of a challenge, and we will not discuss it here.23
It is not hard to see that provided there remains a ﬁnite number of products (i.e. character-
istic bundles), nothing from our previous semiparametric approach need change. Carrying
out steps 1 and 2a, we can compute the bid strategy for any type, where a type is now a
pair (α,γ). Then given a parametric assumption on the joint distribution of (α,γ), we can
simulate moments as before and match them with sample moments.
Yet under stronger assumptions we can use a much simpler estimation procedure. Suppose
that agents condition only on the characteristics of the object under auction, so that z is the
state variable.24 Assume also that supply is exogenous and uncorrelated over time, by which
we mean that the characteristics zt of the goods to be auctioned are drawn independently
each period from a ﬁxed distribution with discrete support. Then the states evolve as a
23But see Li and Vuong (1998) for a measurement error approach that would allow deconvolution of bids
into common and idiosyncratic components if the unobserved heterogeneity ξt was iid over time and not
known by the agents in advance of period t.
24Provided there are a ﬁnite number of products, and therefore characteristic bundles, the state space
remains ﬁnite.
21random walk, and the bidding function is:
β(α,γ,z)=x − ￿ v(x)=αz + γ − ￿ v(α,γ)
where the ﬁrst equality follows because the ex-ante continuation value is independent of the
state, and the second follows by substituting in for the valuation.
Now, let the mean type be (µα,µ γ)=( EF[α],E F[γ]). Then we can write bids as:
bit = αizt + γi − ￿ v(α,γ)=µ0 + µαzt + εit (5)
for µ0 = E[γ − ￿ v(α,γ)] and εit = zt(αi − µα)+γ − ￿ v(α,γ) − E[γ − ￿ v(α,γ)].
Now, since entry is exogenous and the type distribution F is independent of the current good
zt, the types of new bidders will be uncorrelated with zt. This implies the orthogonality
condition E[ztεit] = 0. So from (5) we can estimate the mean tastes for the characteristics
µα by OLS regression of bids on characteristics.25 This hedonic regression may be all that is
needed in some applications. It is worth noting though that the simple OLS approach requires
that states evolve as a random walk and that bidder entry into the market is independent
of the products being oﬀered.
One might wonder why such a simple approach is possible here and not elsewhere. The key
is that a characteristic-based model places strong and linear restrictions on the relationships
between the valuations. Whereas in the general product space model we had to look at joint
bids on objects A and B for inference, implying a need to understand the dynamic selection
process driving bidders into that pair of auctions, here we can just look at bids on A and
infer the valuation for B from their taste for the common characteristic z. This means that
it suﬃces to look only at the initial bids of new bidders — which is a sample of types directly
from F — and completely abstract from dynamic selection concerns.
5M o n t e C a r l o
We perform a simple Monte Carlo exercise to test both our nonparametric and parametric
estimation approaches in small samples. In the simple case there are two goods, and bidders
25In practice, since we have conditional heteroscedasticity, using a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS)
approach will be more eﬃcient than OLS. This may be important in small samples.
22condition their bids only on the identity of the good and their private information, so there
are two corresponding public states. In each period, each of these goods is equally likely to
be listed. The number of entrants k is always 3 each period, but exit is random with losing
bidders exiting with probability ρ =0 .25 and winning bidders exiting with certainty. The
discount rate δ is set to 0.99. We consider alternative parameterizations for k and ρ. Bidders’
private valuations are distributed bivariate normal with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ,
which we also allow to vary in diﬀerent Monte Carlo experiments.
Data is generated by ﬁrst solving for the bidding function via policy iteration – though we
have only been able to prove this converges in general for |S| = 1 (see Theorem 1), it has
converged in all of our experiments to date. Then for each Monte Carlo iteration we simulate
a dataset of 500 auctions, after discounting an initial 10,000 auctions as a ”burn in”. This
amounts to, in expectation, 250 auctions per product, which seems like a moderate amount
of data, especially given the volume of transactions online.
We run both estimation routines assuming that the econometrician knows the entry process,
the discount rate δ and that the transitions between states are random rather than Markov.
In the common ﬁrst stage, we estimate the probability of exit ρ, and the probability of
good one being listed, q. Then in the nonparametric second stage approach, we estimate
the marginals of the type density using a Gaussian kernel density estimation approach with
automatic bandwidth choice by cross-validation. In the parametric estimation, we (correctly)
specify a multivariate normal distribution for the types, and take a minimum distance (MD)
approach by matching the mean and variance of bids for each state in which a bidder may be
observed, as well as the covariance between bids in each state for bidders observed in both.
Our results for the simple case are presented in Table 1. Experiment A is a baseline case with
k =3 ,ρ =1 /4, and symmetric µ and Σ. Experiment B slowed the rate of entry and random
exit, allowing for fewer, but longer-lived bidders. Experiments C and D add positive and
negative correlation between valuations, respectively, and ﬁnally experiment E adds positive
correlation as well as signiﬁcant asymmetry in the means and variance terms. Estimates
from the structural models proposed in this paper appear in panel 1 for each experiment.
Panel 2 presents, for comparison, estimates from a naive approach that treats each observed
bid as a draw from the distribution of private valuations.
The supply parameter p and exit probability ρ are precisely estimated. Estimates of µ and
Σ come from the parametric approach, and are found to be accurate and encouragingly
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Figure 1: Monte Carlo Simulation The ﬁgure shows the true and estimated marginal density of
valuations for product 1 for a randomly chosen Monte Carlo simulation of 500 auctions with speciﬁcation E.
precise for all parameterizations of the model. The naive approach gets both the means and
the variances wrong in a statistically signiﬁcant way. This bias derives from three sources
that we have dealt with in our model: repeat bidding, selection by type, and bid shading
according to the option value of losing.
In the far-right hand columns appear estimates of the mean integrated squared error (MISE),
which is a measure of goodness-of-ﬁt for our nonparametric approach.26 We report MISE for
the marginal distributions of types in both dimensions. In comparing these numbers, note
that MISE is not a normalized measure, and is therefore not comparable across speciﬁcations.
We can, however, compare the MISE generated by the structural approach with the MISE
generated by the naive approach, and we see substantial improvement, with the structural
model often doing a full order of magnitude better. For a graphical intuition of the ﬁt
achieved, Figure 1 depicts the true and the estimated marginal distribution of types for
good 1 from experiment E of the simple model.
We also run a parallel set of Monte Carlo experiments for a forward-looking model, which
is based on the identiﬁcation example presented earlier in the paper. Now bidders pay
attention to the good being auctioned in the next period, which means we now have four
public states. Results are presented in Table 2. While the more complicated structure of
the model has a cost in precision, both estimators continue to dramatically outperform the
26For a candidate distribution fn(x) and a true distribution f(x) this is calculated according to MISE = ￿
(fn(x) − f(x))2dF(x)
24naive approach under all speciﬁcations. Note that the cost in precision is much more severe
for the nonparametric approach– this is because, with four states instead of two, the sample
of bidders for which we observe bids in every state is much smaller.
Finally, we run the same set of experiments for a backwards-looking variation on the model.
In this version, the public state variable consists of the product being auctioned today as
well as a dummy for whether there were more than 9 bidders in the previous auction. This
is meant to capture inference regarding the level of demand. Results are presented in Table
3. It turns out that the level of demand only aﬀects the bidding strategies of a small fraction
of types signiﬁcantly. Estimation performs roughly on par with that in the forward-looking
model. As in that case, however, while estimates of σ12 are within two standard deviations
of the truth, when the truth is nonzero the results consistently exhibit attenuation.
6 Conclusion
We have developed an estimable demand system for a large auction market. By deﬁning and
focusing on competitive Markov equilibria, we got an intuitive and tractable characterization
of bidder strategies. We also showed existence of equilibrium, arguing that regardless of the
initial conditions of the market, there is strong convergence to a stationary type distribution.
A key result was that demand is identiﬁed from panel data, in which the same bidder is
observed repeatedly bidding in diﬀerent states.
Turning to estimation, we outlined two diﬀerent approaches for recovering the distribution of
types. These were tested by Monte Carlo simulation. From these exercises, we learned that
accounting for dynamics and allowing for multiple products is important. Na¨ ıve estimates
based on treating the data as a cross-section are systematically biased downwards, and are
unable to account for correlation in the valuations for diﬀerent products.
Understanding these basic empirical problems will be helpful for future research. We hope
also that this is a ﬁrst step towards obtaining satisfying models for other markets: those
where bidders have market power, or non-unit demand. In future work, we would like to
take this model to data and see how it performs.
25References
Ackerberg, D. A. (2003): “Advertising, learning, and consumer choice in experience good
markets: an empirical examination,” International Economic Review,4 4 ( 3 ) ,1 0 0 7 — 1 0 4 0 .
(2009): “A new use of importance sampling to reduce computational burden in
simulation estimation,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics,7 ( 4 ) ,3 4 3 — 3 7 6 .
Ackerberg, D. A., K. Hirano, and Q. Shahriar (2009): “Identiﬁcation of Time and
Risk Preferences in Buy Price Auctions,” working paper, UCLA.
Adams, C. P. (2009): “Identifying Demand from Online Auction Data,” Working Paper,
Federal Trade Commission.
Ai, C., and X. Chen (2003): “Eﬃcient Estimation of Models with Conditional Moment
Restrictions Containing Unknown Functions,” Econometrica,7 1 ( 6 ) ,1 7 9 5 – 1 8 4 3 .
Andrews, D. W. K. (1994): “Asymptotics for Semiparametric Econometric Models Via
Stochastic Equicontinuity,” Econometrica,6 2 ( 1 ) ,4 3 – 7 2 .
Athey, S. (2001): “Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria
in Games of Incomplete Information,” Econometrica,6 9 ( 4 ) ,8 6 1 — 8 8 9 .
Athey, S., and P. A. Haile (2002): “Identiﬁcation of Standard Auction Models,” Econo-
metrica,7 0 ( 6 ) ,2 1 0 7 – 2 1 4 0 .
Bajari, P., L. Benkard, and J. Levin (2007): “Estimating Dynamic Models of Imper-
fect Competition,” Econometrica,7 5 ( 5 ) ,1 3 3 1 – 1 3 7 0 .
Bajari, P., and A. Hortacsu (2004): “Economic Insights from Internet Auctions,” Jour-
nal of Economic Literature,4 2 ( 2 ) ,4 5 7 – 4 8 6 .
Berry, S. (1994): “Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Product Diﬀerentiation,” Rand
Journal of Economics,2 5 ,2 4 2 – 2 6 2 .
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995): “Automobile Prices in Market Equilib-
rium,” Econometrica,6 3 ( 4 ) ,8 4 1 – 8 9 0 .
(2004): “Diﬀerentiated Products Demand Systems from a Combination of Micro
and Macro Data: The New Car Market,” The Journal of Political Economy, pp. 68—105.
26Budish, E. (2008): “Sequencing and Information Revelation in Auctions for Imperfect
Substitutes: Understanding eBay’s Market Design,” Working paper, Harvard University.
Duffie, D., J. Geanakoplos, A. Mas-Colell, and A. McLennan (1994): “Station-
ary Markov Equilibria,” Econometrica,6 2 ( 4 ) ,7 4 5 — 7 8 1 .
Eilenberg, S., and D. Montgomery (1946): “Fixed point Theorems for Multi-Valued
Transformations,” American Journal of Mathematics,6 8 ,2 1 4 — 2 2 2 .
Fershtman, C., and A. Pakes (2009): “Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric
Information: A Framework for Applied Work,” Working Paper, Harvard University.
Gowrisankaran, G., and M. Rysman (2009): “Dynamics of Consumer Demand for New
Durable Goods,” Working paper, University of Arizona.
Guerre, E., I. Perrigne, and Q. Vuong (2000): “Optimal Nonparametric Estimation
of First-Price Auctions,” Econometrica,6 8 ( 3 ) ,5 2 5 – 5 7 4 .
Hansen, L. P. (1982): “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Es-
timators,” Econometrica,5 0 ,1 0 2 9 — 1 0 5 4 .
Hendricks, K., and R. Porter (2007): “A Survey of Empirical Work in Auctions,”
in Handbook of Industrial Organization, ed. by M. Armstrong, and R. Porter, vol. III.
North-Holland.
Ingster, A. (2009): “A Structural Study of a Dynamic Auction Market,” Working Paper,
NYU Stern.
Jofre-Benet, M., and M. Pesendorfer (2003): “Estimation of a Dynamic Auction
Game,” Econometrica,7 1 ( 5 ) ,1 4 4 3 – 1 4 8 9 .
Jovanovic, B., and R. W. Rosenthal (1988): “Anonymous Sequential Games,” Journal
of Mathematical Economics,1 7 ( 1 ) ,7 7 — 8 7 .
Krusell, P., and A. A. Smith (1998): “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macroe-
conomy,” Journal of Political Economy,1 0 6 ( 5 ) ,8 6 7 — 8 9 6 .
Li, T., and Q. Vuong (1998): “Nonparametric Estimation of the Measurement Error
Model Using Multiple Indicators,” Journal of Multivariate Analysis,6 5 ,1 3 5 — 1 6 5 .
27McFadden, D. (1974): “Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior,” in Fron-
tiers in Econometrics, ed. by P. Zarembka, pp. 105—142. Academic Press.
Meyn, S., and R. L. Tweedie (2009): Markov Chains and Stochastic Stability. Cambridge
University Press.
Milgrom, P., and R. Weber (2000): “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
II,” in The Economic Theory of Auctions, ed. by P. Klemperer. Edward Elgar Publishing
Ltd.
Pakes, A., M. Ostrovsky, and S. Berry (2007): “Simple Estimators for the Parameters
of Discrete Dynamic Games, with Entry/Exit Examples,” Rand Journal of Economics,
38(2), 373—399.
Pakes, A., and D. Pollard (1989): “Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization
Estimators,” Econometrica,5 7 ( 5 ) ,1 0 2 7 – 1 0 5 7 .
Pesendorfer, M., and P. Schmidt-Dengler (2003): “Identiﬁcation and Estimation of
Dynamic Games,” Working Paper, LSE.
Reny, P. J. (2008): “On the Existence of Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games,” Work-
ing Paper, University of Chicago.
Said, M. (2009): “Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Eﬃciency and Revenue Maximiza-
tion,” Working paper, Yale University.
Sailer, K. (2006): “Searching the eBay Marketplace,” Working Paper, University of Mu-
nich.
Satterthwaite, M., and A. Shneyerov (2007): “Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided In-
complete Information and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect
Competition,” Econometrica,7 5 ( 1 ) ,1 5 5 – 2 0 0 .
Stokey, N. L., R. E. Lucas, and E. C. Prescott (1989): Recursive Methods in
Economic Dynamics. Harvard University Press.
Weintraub, G., C. L. Benkard, and B. Van Roy (2008): “Markov Perfect Industry
Dynamics with Many Firms,” Econometrica,7 6 ( 6 ) ,1 3 7 5 – 1 4 1 1 .
28Wolinsky, A. (1988): “Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding,” The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies,5 5 ( 1 ) ,7 1 — 8 4 .
Zeithammer, R. (2006): “Forward-looking bidding in online auctions,” Journal of Mar-
keting Research,4 3 ( 3 ) ,4 6 2 – 4 7 6 .
(2009): “Sequential auctions with information about future goods,” Working paper,
UCLA Anderson.
29Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Conditional on a positive bid, the expected payoﬀ function π(b,s) has
the form:
π(b,s)=
￿ b
0
(xt − B
1)g(B
1|s)dB
1 +
￿￿ ∞
b
g(B
1|s)dB
1
￿
(1 − ρ)δ
S ￿
s￿=1
v(x,s
￿)Qss￿
since we show in Corollary 1 below that the highest bid has a density on R+. Writing
￿ v(x,s)f o r( 1− ρ)δ
￿S
s￿=1 v(x,s￿)Qss￿, and taking an FOC in b,w eg e t( xt − b)g(B1|s) −
g(B1|s)￿ v(x,s) = 0, which has unique solution bt = xt − ￿ v(x,s). If this is negative, then the
corner solution bt = 0 delivers the highest payoﬀ conditional on a positive bid; and it is easily
shown that non-participation φ does better still because the probability of winning with a
bid of zero is positive (e.g. there may be no other bidders in the market).
Proof of Lemma 2: By Theorem 11.12 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), uniform
geometric convergence in total variation norm will be achieved if their “condition M” holds:
there exists ε>0 and N ≥ 1 such that for all A ∈F , either P N(ω,A) ≥ εω∈ Ω
or P N(ω,Ac) ≥ ε ∀ω ∈ Ω, for P N the N-step transition probability. Let s0 = T(0,1) and
ω0 =( 0,s 0) (i.e. ω0 is a superset of the true state where there are no current participants, nor
have been for the observable history; and upcoming supply is entirely of object 1). Let p0 =
P(Et =0 |Nt−1 =0 )> 0, by assumption; let q0 = P(jt = 1); and let N0 = max{kf,k h} +1 .
Then P N0(ω,ω0) ≥ ρ
¯ N(p0q0)N0 > 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω. Choosing N = N0 and ε = ρ
¯ N(p0q0)N0−1,
condition M holds since either ω0 ∈ A or ω0 ∈ Ac. Next, consider the marginal ergodic
distribution on X
¯ N−1 ×S produced by integrating out the ﬁrst non-zero element of the type
vector. Since S is ﬁnite, there is a well-deﬁned conditional distribution of x−i given s.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let the action space Ak be a ﬁnite grid {φ,0, ¯ x
k, 2¯ x
k ···¯ x}S, with each
dimension totally ordered as written. Endow Ak with the Euclidean metric denoted d,w h e r e
φ is treated as having value −¯ x
k . Here, we deﬁne strategies as mappings from type to actions,
β : X→A k, and write β(x)=( β1(x),β2(x)···βS(x)). For each s, let λ(s) ∈Jbe the
object under auction in state s; the mapping is well deﬁned because of restriction (i) on the
coarsening T. As in the text, we call β monotone if βs(x) is increasing in xj if j = λ(s) and
decreasing otherwise. Following Reny (2008), let M denote the space of monotone functions
30from X to Ak, and deﬁne a metric δ on M by:
δ(β,β
￿)=
￿
X
d(β(x),β
￿(x))dµ(x)
As shown there, (M,δ) is a compact absolute retract. Deﬁne the payoﬀ function u(a,t,β−i),
equal to the value of the game for type t when playing action vector a, everyone else follows
strategy β−i, and the invariant measure over true states is determined as though everyone
plays β−i. As Reny (2008) shows, the interim payoﬀ function U(β,β−i)=
￿
X u(β(t),t,β −i)dµ(x)
is continuous in both arguments since the type distribution is atomless.
Let Γ(β−i) be the best response correspondence; by the theorem of the maximum it is non-
empty valued and upper-hemicontinuous. A ﬁxed point of the correspondence, β∗, will be
a CME, since then strategies will be optimal given that the invariant measure over types is
generated by play of β∗. The existence of such a ﬁxed point is guaranteed by the ﬁxed point
theorem due to Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946) if we can show that Γ is contractible-
valued and Γ(β−i) ∈ M whenever β−i ∈ M.
Fix β−i ∈ M and x ∈X , and let ￿ v(x,s) still denote the ex-ante continuation value given
optimal actions. Then we can look at the optimal action state by state, and we have
b∗
s = argmaxb∈Ak G1(b|s)(xλ(s)−E[B1|B1 ≤ b,s])+(1−G1(b|s))￿ v(x,s). Deﬁne bl
s = maxb{b :
xλ(s) −E[B1|B1 ≤ b,s]− ￿ v(x,s) > 0} and bu
s = minb{b : xt −E[B1|B1 ≤ b,s]− ￿ v(x,s) < 0}.
Comparing their payoﬀs directly, we see that bl
s yields higher payoﬀ than bu
s; this proves that
these two bids could not both be best responses. Next, at least one of these must be a best
response — suppose b<b l
s is optimal, then xt −E[B1|B1 ≤ b,s]−￿ v(x,s) > 0; but since the
payoﬀ function is a weighted sum of xt−E[B1|B1 ≤ b,s] and ￿ v(x,s), and G1(b|s) is (weakly)
increasing in b for β−i ∈ M, bl
s must be weakly better still, and also a best response. The
same argument holds on the other side. In sum, either bl
s or bu
s (but not both) is part of the
optimal strategy, and the best response is unique unless G1(b|s) is constant over actions in
some state (i.e. β−i assigns no mass to these actions).
Two results follow. First, since bl
s and bu
s are increasing in xλ(s) and decreasing in x−λ(s) —
since v increases in x−λ(s) — the best response to any β−i ∈ M is also in M. Second, given
best responses b and b￿, the join b∨b￿ is also a best response, since the probability of winning
must be constant over those actions, and so taking the coordinate-wise max doesn’t change
payoﬀs at all. Γ is thus join-closed and non-empty for β−i ∈ M.
Finally, then, we need to construct a contraction on the best reply correspondence. We
31slightly adapt Reny (2008) because actions are not increasing in type in all states. Fix β−i
and (β,β0) ∈ Γ(β−i). Let Fi(x) be the marginal distribution of valuations for product i, and
deﬁne functions Φs(x)=
Fλ(s)(x)− ¯ F−λ(s)(x)+1
2 , where ¯ F−λ(s)(x) is the average valuation quantile
of objects not auctioned at s. Then deﬁne
h
s(τ,β)(x)=

   
   
βs(x), if Φs(x) ≤| 1 − 2τ| and τ<0.5
βs
0(x), if Φs(x) ≤| 1 − 2τ| and τ ≥ 0.5
βs
0(x) ∨ βs(x), if Φs(x) > |1 − 2τ|
Deﬁne h(τ,β)(x)=( h1(τ,β)(x),h 2(τ,β)(x)···hS(τ,β)(x)). It can be veriﬁed that h(τ,β)
is monotone, continuous and a best reply almost everywhere. This proves Γ contractible
valued, and hence it has a ﬁxed point on M, showing existence for the ﬁnite action game.
To complete the proof, it suﬃces to show that there is a limiting set of strategies in which
no positive measure of types makes a bid b ∈ R+ in any state s (a positive measure of types
bidding φ presents no problems). But we showed earlier that for any grid ﬁneness k, either
bl
s or bu
s is played by every type x against the equilibrium strategy β∗
k; taking a limit as
k →∞ , we get that strategy β∞(x)=b for b solving xλ(s) − ￿ v(x,s) = 0 is played in some
limit equilibrium for all x. Fix this equilibrium, some state s and some bid b ∈ R+. Since
β∞(x) is strictly increasing in xt, the set of types bidding b must be of dimension J −1 and
thus Lebesgue-negligible. Finally, since the type distribution is absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure, this implies the measure of types bidding b is zero.
For the uniqueness claim, deﬁne an operator Γ(β)(x,s)=x − ￿ vβ(x,s) on the space of
continuous strictly increasing pure strategies under the sup norm. Showing Γ a contraction
mapping suﬃces to prove uniqueness:
￿Γ(β) − Γ(￿ β)￿ = max
s∈S
sup
x∈X
|￿ vβ(x,s) − ￿ ve β(x,s)|
≤ max
s∈S
sup
x∈X
|G
β
1 (β(x,s))(x − E[B1|B1 ≤ β(x,s),s])
− G
e β
1
￿
￿ β(x,s)
￿￿
x − E[B1|B1 ≤ ￿ β(x,s),s]
￿
|
≤ max
s∈S
sup
x∈X
G1 (β(x,s))
￿
￿ ￿E[B1|B1 ≤ β(x,s),s] − E[B1|B1 ≤ ￿ β(x,s),s]
￿
￿ ￿
≤￿ β − ￿ β￿
32where in the third line we use the fact that G
β
1 (β(x,s)) = G
e β
1
￿
￿ β(x,s)
￿
for all x and s. This
property holds because under both strategies the same winner is chosen in each auction (types
are totally ordered for J = 1), and thus the transition functions and invariant measures over
types are the same in both cases; implying the distribution functions are equal if evaluated
at the bids of a ﬁxed type x in any state s.
Corollary 1. In equilibrium the distribution G(b|b>0,s) is absolutely continuous for all s.
Proof: Since the equilibrium bid function is strictly monotone on b ≥ 0, and the max
operator selecting the highest bid is continuous, it will suﬃce to show that the invariant
measure on the type space µx is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
So ﬁx a Lebesgue-negligible set A on X
¯ N, and let C = A×S. Following Meyn and Tweedie
(2009), let L(x,C) = limN→∞ P N(x,C). It suﬃces to show L(x,C) = 0. But to reach
C, one must draw a sequence of types from A, and since the distribution of entrants F is
absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, if A is negligible, the probability
of those draws is zero. Thus L(x,c) = 0, completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2: Following precisely the logic of the identiﬁcation example, we can write
the vector of continuation values of a bidder who bids b as the solution to a linear system
V =( I − δ(1 − ρ)Q)−1u, where Q is the transition matrix, ρ = ρ1,ρ 2 ···ρS is the vector
of exit probabilities and u =[ u1,u 2 ···uS] is the S-length vector with terms of the form
us = G1(bs|s)(bs − E[B1|B1 <b s,s]). Notice that since bs = φ is possible, we may have
us = 0 for some s. Q and ρ are identiﬁed from the data, δ is assumed known and u is
identiﬁed for any bidder observed bidding in every state. Also (I − δQ)−1 exists for δ<1.
Given these objects, the ex-ante continuation value is identiﬁed for all complete observations.
Now ﬁx any set B ⊂J. Then to get the valuation vector restricted to B, xB, we simply
add the continuation value to the bid for each of |B| states where distinct products in B
are auctioned, where the bids are positive on B by assumption. Moreover, any type in the
interior of the support of FB has a positive probability of generating a complete observation.
So by re-weighting the density of valuations for complete observations, we recover FB. The
correct re-weighting factor is P(S,x), identiﬁed from the data and deﬁned in (7) below.
Selection Correction Probabilities: Let A be a subset of S. We want to get the probability
that any type x ends up submitting bids in the states in A. Deﬁne p(x,s)=G1(β(x,s)|s)+
(1 − G1(β(x,s)|s))ρ(s), which is just the probability that a type x will exit the sample in
state s, whether by winning or losing. Also deﬁne P(B,x,s) to be the probability of a bidder
33x who enters the sample in state s being observed bidding only in states B ⊆S .W e c a n
express this recursively:
P(B,x,s)=1 ( s ∈ B)
￿
p(x,s)+( 1− p(x,s))
￿
s￿∈B
Qss￿P(B,x,s
￿)
￿
(6)
Then the probability of observing a bidder x in group A can be deﬁned implicitly as:
P(A,x)=
￿
s∈A
π(s)P(A,x,s) −
￿
B⊂A
P(B,x)( 7 )
where π is the invariant measure over states. The idea is simply that the probability of
seeing bids for every state s in A is equal to the probability that the bidder stays within A
less the probability that he stays in a strict subset of A.
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